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FURTHER REFLECTIONS
Judith Resnik

As Professor Hazard's commentary suggests, we have some areas of agreement. First, we agree that there are some trial courts
which are, in Professor Hazard's words, "brutal production lines."'
Second, Professor Hazard and I share concerns about how to minimize the pain and the wrongs that judges, whether out of haste or
hostility, sometimes impose upon individuals and upon society as a
whole. We agree (again, in Professor Hazard's words) that "[t]here
ought to be some review of trial judges to prevent them from becoming autocratic or otherwise behaving badly. The sorry history of
human experience is that judges if unreviewable will indeed act autocratically, or with haste, sloth, indifference, distraction, ignorance,
'2
bias, malevolence, or vengeance."
Thereafter, however, Professor Hazard and I part company.
First, Professor Hazard frames his remarks about my comments as if
my only topic were the scope of federal habeas corpus review of
state criminal convictions. While I do refer to state courts, criminal
cases, and habeas corpus as examples, neither the article published
in this symposium nor a previous work, 3 which discussed many related topics, is limited to the question of what weight federal courts
should accord prior state court judgments of conviction. Rather, I
am concerned with the general topic of preclusion. I believe that
the underlying value judgments to be made-about power distribution, economy, and a host of other issues-are parallel whether the
example is federal habeas corpus or the right of appeal within a unitary system. I am as much interested in how to determine whether a
federal court of appeals should give preclusive effect to a federal
district court's judgment as I am in the question of whether a district
court should give preclusive effect to a state court judgment.
As a consequence of his misperception about the reach of my
argument, Professor Hazard devotes his criticism to discussing the
quality of adjudication in state criminal court trials and the role of
federal post-conviction review in responding to (as Professor Hazard puts it) the "brutal production lines" in "most state criminal
1 Hazard, Reflections on the Substance ofFinality, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 642, 649 (1985).
2
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seems to nave misunaersooa my views.
namer man aiuress my
concern that most first tier decisionmakers (in administrative agencies, state court, and even, to some extent, in the federal trial courts)
have overwhelming numbers of cases, inadequate resources and
poor working conditions, Professor Hazard chooses to characterize
5
my commentary as concluding that all state courts are "bad."
Thereafter, he implicitly accuses me of seeking unattainable
goals for federal and state court judges. Professor Hazard argues
that no legal work-products 6 would meet the standards of law school
faculties. However, as Professor Hazard clearly understands, judges
are cloaked with the power of the state, and their orders alter our
lives profoundly. Further, as Professor Hazard acknowledges, "such
people Ojudges] regularly fail." 7 Professor Hazard seems to view
such failures as random events and concludes that the failures are
"not remediable, except in occasional exemplary instances." 8
I am both more pessimistic and optimistic than Professor Hazard. I am more pessimistic because I believe that the failure rate is
substantial-that, while there are individual miscarriages of justice,
many of the problems are systemic and need to be addressed at that
level. I am more optimistic because, although I comprehend the
enormity of the difficulty, I believe in the possibility of remedy; for
example, I believe that it is plausible in some cases to prefer the
deliberative decisionmaking of three persons, with time for contemplation, to that of one person who has little time or energy, even for
momentary reflection.
From Professor Hazard's comments, it appears that he is himself fundamentally ambivalent about the question of review. As
noted above, he is concerned about autocratic judicial power and
therefore argues that at least appeal should be available. Yet, Professor Hazard claims that most appeals are of little value. -"More
words and more law, but no more facts." 9 There are two problems
with this view. First, Professor Hazard is wrong-at least in the
arena in which he chooses to focus, post-conviction review. There
are cases in which new information can come to light only by virtue
of collateral factfinding. For example, to establish many ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, information is needed beyond the record of the trial or sentencing courts. The question (in part) is what
4
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a competent attorney could have done. 10 In most instances, such
facts cannot be developed until collateral proceedings are commenced, 1 at which time "more facts" are indeed developed. Furthermore, in civil cases, reviewing courts conclude with some
frequency that insufficient factual information has been developed
in a first round and therefore remand cases to lower courts to develop a more comprehensive record. Professor Hazard's assumption of "more words and more law, but no more facts" is predicated
upon the not always accurate assumption of a competent first round.
Second, Professor Hazard appears to be in the unhappy position of
advocating some review but believing it by and large worthless.
While Professor Hazard devotes much of his commentary to the virtues of finality, he offers almost no discussion of the virtues of review-of the desirability of diffusing power, of permitting litigants
additional persuasion opportunities, of imbuing some decisions
with greater import by having them made repeatedly.
Further evidence of Professor Hazard's ambivalence is found in
his tentative endorsement of the proposition that "finality should be
given still greater emphasis so that the state courts can have more
time to try to be fairer in the first place."' 12 First, on a theoretical
level, it is unclear how far Professor Hazard wants to take this argument; the logical conclusion, of course, would be the abolition of
appeal and the transfer to the trial level of all resources now devoted to appeal. Second, on a practical level, Professor Hazard's
thesis seems dependent upon an inaccurate assumption. Professor
Hazard claims that the reason to limit federal review is to conserve
resources of the state criminal courts. Resources would be conserved only if, upon federal habeas review, there were a large
number of convictions reversed-thus obliging state judges either
to retry or to dismiss charges. But the data available from federal
post-conviction review do not support this assumption. Rather, reversal rates are very low, and the number of retrials insignificant.13
Thus, championing the desirability of appeal and post-conviction
review need not be perceived as relegating state criminal trial courts
10

See Striddand v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-70 (1984).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 670 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1926 (1984) ("customary procedure for challenging the effectiveness of defense
counsel in a federal criminal trial is by collateral attack. . . because usually such a claim
cannot be advanced without the development of facts outside the original record") (citations omitted).
12 Hazard, supra note 1, at 649.
13
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or any other first tier to "suggestion-making."

14

Most first tier deci-

sions remain as binding rulings. I admit to some degree of puzzlement at how Professor Hazard can worry that judges would have too
little, rather than too much, power.
Of course, some state prosecutorial time is spent in defending
post-conviction attacks, but again, it is unclear why Professor Hazard chooses to characterize that investment of time as "large."' 15
Data suggest that fewer than three per hundred state or federal prisoners seek post-conviction review in federal court and that less than
five percent of a federal district court docket is devoted to such
cases. 16 Further, there is no basis for Professor Hazard's assumption that the resources spent adjudicating habeas litigation "deal
with marginal procedural issues usually irrelevant to guilt" and that,
because of this resource expenditure, other individuals wait in the
"long queue."' 17 Empirical studies of habeas litigation reveal a wide
variety of claims, many of which are guilt-related.' 8 Further, many
of the major Supreme Court decisions on habeas corpus are cases in
which such issues as the burden of proof in criminal cases and the
quality of counsel are raised. 19 I doubt Professor Hazard would describe such cases as involving "marginal procedural issues" or
"technical regularity." 20 Finally, Professor Hazard's comments
surely do not reflect the statistic that, in death penalty cases decided
on the merits by the federal courts of appeal from 1976 to 1983, the
2 1
habeas petitioners prevailed seventy percent of the time.
Finally, Professor Hazard objects to my discussion of "models"
of adjudication. He prefers to discuss adjudication as embodying
"elements of both fairness and finality." 22 By electing to "put the
problem" in a "simpler" fashion, 23 by limiting his discussion to
what he terms fairness and finality and what others have described
as the struggle between "justice" and "efficiency," Professor Hazard
14 Hazard, supra note 1, at 650.
15 Id. at 649.
16 Resnik, supra note 3, at 942-51 (estimates based upon data from Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, from United States Department ofJustice, and from
National Criminal Justice Information Service).
17 Hazard, supra note 1, at 649.
18 See, e.g., Allen, Schachtman & Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and Its Reform: An
EmpiricalAnalysis, 13 RUrGERS L.J. 675 (1982); Shapiro, FederalHabeas Corpus: A Study in
Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REv. 321 (1973).
19 See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (burden of proof); United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (burden of proof); Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052

(1984) (assistance of counsel).
20 Hazard, supra note 1, at 649 & 650.
21 Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3405 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (rely-

ing upon research by NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund).
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does not capture all of the tradeoffs to be made. By looking only at
fairness/finality, Professor Hazard implicitly suggests that procedure has only the instrumental goal of producing outcomes. The
problem for Professor Hazard seems to be how to weigh the need
for a number of outcomes against concerns that an outcome in an
individual case is in error.
I believe that, while outcome production is an important purpose of procedure, procedure has other goals. Because I believe
that the normative, political functions of procedure are as important
as its outcome production function, I find it helpful to discuss several elements of procedure and not limit my consideration to justice
and efficiency or fairness and finality. That is why I provided a discussion of several valued features of adjudication-litigant persuasion opportunities and autonomy, decisionmakers' power, their
impartiality, visibility, and rationality, finality, revisionism, economy,.
consistency, differentiation and ritual. In my view, we must understand the interaction among these valued features to assess the advisibility of giving preclusive weight to decisions rendered by any
one set of decisionmakers.
Professor Hazard complains that, in my discussion, I provide no
"norm" 24 by which to assess the preferences to be made. I disagree:
a central norm for me is concern about power concentration-a
concern evidently not shared (to the same degree) by Professor
Hazard and hardly shared at all by a majority of the current
Supreme Court. I fear for a society in which single individuals can
determine whether a person is to be imprisoned, can decide
whether a person is to win or lose property, can make all decisions
about what rights the state will enforce-all without curbs on his or
her authority.
Professor Hazard also shares concern about social values, but
for some reason he takes as symbolic of current social understanding the highly controversial case of Bernard Goetz.2 5 For reasons
not made totally dear, Professor Hazard sees the Goetz incident as
linked to the availability of post-conviction review. I do not believe
that Goetz shot four people because he was angry at a system in
which some small fraction of criminal cases are reviewed on appeal
and an even smaller fraction of convictions are reconsidered by federal courts while the defendants remain in prison. Goetz, his defenders, and all of us share fears of criminal attack. But fear for
one's own safety does not translate (for me) into a mandate for empowering individuals to make final decisions. After all, it is the finality of Goetz's decision that is horrific. Goetz is an example of what
24
25

Id.
Id. at 652.
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is frightening-inordinate power concentrations in any one person.
We should not impose such finality in cases in which we have reasons to suspect both that the process is unfair and the outcome inappropriate. Such "finality" would institutionalize the ills we must
struggle against.

